香港 or 美国在强化打击洗钱与恐怖融资措施方面的进展情况。
2020-09-15

前言:香港公司开户之难是这两年企业的难题,不论你是有实力公司还是刚刚成立的小微企业,面对银行开户而提交繁多的材料多多少少都很抱怨,审批时间也很久,难道银行也愿意这样做吗?有的客户说,以前开户很简单,当天就可以拿到帐户,而今日开户如此之难,想也没想到。以下真实案例就非常清晰说明了银行为什么要对客户的开户资质审核如此之严了。

图片来源 / 图虫创意

香港海关9月14日宣布,成功侦破一宗怀疑清洗黑钱案件,涉案金额超过30亿港元,涉及金额为历来海关处理同类型案件中最高。

香港海关表示:

已经拘捕六名年龄在25-62岁之间的人士,其中一名为本地找换店(外币兑换店)的持牌人,其余五名为一家五口。

香港海关有组织罪案调查科高级监督胡伟军在记者会表示,该家庭成员包括父母以及三名子女五人自2018年以来开设超过100个个人账户,参与约6000宗大宗交易,金额由数万至数千万港元不等。

“两名家庭成员无业,其余为找换店经理、技术员、客户服务员等,平均月收入为1.5万至3万港元,家庭总收入约7万港元,但却拥有3000万港元资产,包括1500万存款以及两个物业,市值分别为700万港元及800万港元,家庭财富状况与收入严重不符。”

据悉,海关进行了数月的调查,9月初搜查了4个住宅以及1家找换店,搜查出大量不同公司登记文件,已签名的支票簿等。涉案家庭于2018年及今年年初在香港购买两个物业,目前所有资产已被冻结。

香港贸易管制处金钱服务监理科总贸易管制主任郭翠华透露:

“调查显示,过去两年,上述家庭成员通过不同户口处理多宗大额交易,资金来源来自不同公司或者不相关的第三者,大部分为空壳公司,经过不同户口互相过户后,在短时间内提走,以多次转户的方式掩饰资金来源,这是洗黑钱的惯常手法。”

图片来源 / 图虫创意

根据香港《打击洗钱及恐怖分子资金筹集条例》,洗黑钱属于严重罪行,一经定罪,最高刑罚监禁14年,罚款500万港元。

同时,涉案的找换店利用未向海关登记的个人账户,进行大额交易串谋其他人洗黑钱,涉案的持牌找换店与该家庭今年的交易额达1.7亿港元,但其向海关申报的交易额仅为3000万港元。据了解,上述家庭的一个成员是该找换店经理,目前该找换店已被吊销牌照。

香港海关强调,一向严格执行金钱服务经营者的监理工作,对金钱服务经营者进行合规视察和调查。各持牌金钱服务经营者必须遵守相关的规定,违法者一经定罪,最高可被判罚款100万港元及监禁7年。

香港作为国际金融中心,具备低税率、健全银行服务及不设货币或外汇管制,每日均有来自全球各地的资金在市场进出。

因此,不少跨境犯罪集团均会瞄准这个特性,利用香港独特的金融环境,来掩藏及转运他们的资金及犯罪收益,甚至把香港作为清洗黑钱的基地及“中转站”,将犯罪款项“漂白”后汇出境外。

胡伟军表示,此次的资金流向怀疑与跨国犯罪有关,未来将与内地、海外执法机构,继续追查资金最终目的地。

Paris, 31 March 2020 - Since the 2016 assessment of the United States' measures to tackle money laundering and terrorist financing, the country has taken a number of actions to strengthen its framework.

当地时间2020年3月31日,巴黎报道。自2016年互评估以来,美国采取了一系列行动来强化打击洗钱和恐怖融资的框架。

The United States has been in an enhanced follow-up process following the adoption of its mutual evaluation in 2016. In line with the FATF Procedures for mutual evaluations, the country has reported back to the FATF on the actions it has taken since then.

美国自2016年互评估报告获通过以来一直处在强化后续进程。根据金融行动特别工作组(FATF)的互评估程序,本次美国向FATF报告了过去几年采取的行动。

To reflect the United States' progress, the FATF has re-rated the country on the following Recommendation:

FATF对以下技术合规性指标进行了重新评级,以反映美国的进展情况:

l Recommendation 10 (Customer Due Diligence) - from Partially Compliant to Largely Compliant

l 建议10(客户尽职调查):从“部分合规”上调至“大致合规”

The report also looks at whether the United States' measures meet the requirements of FATF Recommendations that have changed since the 2016 mutual evaluation. The FATF agreed to maintain the rating of Compliant for Recommendation 2 (National cooperation and coordination), Recommendation 5 (Terrorist financing offence) and Recommendation 21 (Tipping-off and confidentiality). The FATF also maintained the rating of Largely Compliant for Recommendation 7 (Targeted financial sanctions related to proliferation), Recommendation 8 (Non-profit organisations), Recommendation 15 (New technologies) and Recommendation 18 (Internal controls and foreign branches and subsidiaries).

本报告还对美国的措施符合自2016年互评估以来发生过调整的FATF建议新要求的情况进行了考察。FATF同意维持对建议2(国家层面合作与协调)、建议5(恐怖融资犯罪)和建议21(泄密和保密)的“合规”评级,以及对建议7(扩散相关定向金融制裁)、建议8(非营利组织)、建议15(新技术)和建议18(内部控制、境外分支机构和附属机构)的“大致合规”评级。

The United States is now compliant on 9 of the 40 Recommendations and largely compliant on 22 of them. It remains partially compliant on 5 of the 40 Recommendations and not compliant on 4 of them. The United States remains in enhanced follow-up and will report back to the FATF on progress to strengthen its implementation of Anti-Money Laundering / Countering the Financing of Terrorism measures.

目前美国的40项技术合规性指标中有9个“合规”、22个“大致合规”、5个“部分合规”和4个“不合规”。美国仍被列在强化后续进程,并将继续向FATF报告在强化反洗钱和反恐怖融资措施执行方面的进展情况。

UNITED STATES: 3rd ENHANCED FOLLOW-UP REPORT

美国第四轮互评估第三份强化后续报告

1. INTRODUCTION

一、概述

The mutual evaluation report (MER) of the U.S. was adopted in October 2016. The U.S. did not request technical compliance re-ratings during its 1st or 2nd follow-up reports. This follow-up report analyses the U.S.’ progress in addressing certain technical compliance deficiencies which were identified in its MER. Re-rating is given where sufficient progress has been made (Recommendation 10). This report also analyses the U.S.’ progress in implementing new requirements relating to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendations which have changed since the end of the on-site visit to the U.S. in February 2016: Recommendations 2, 5, 7, 8, 15, 18 and 21. This report does not address what progress the U.S. has made to improve its effectiveness. A later follow-up assessment will analyse progress on improving effectiveness which may result in re-ratings of Immediate Outcomes at that time.

FATF于2016年10月通过了美国的第四轮互评估报告(MER)。在前两份后续报告中,美国未提出对技术合规性指标进行重新评级的要求。本次发布的后续报告分析了美国在解决互评估报告中指出的某些技术合规性缺陷方面的进展情况。改进充分的指标(建议10)被给予了重新评级。本报告还分析了美国在执行自2016年2月现场评估结束以来发生过调整的FATF建议(建议2、5、7、8、15、18和21)新要求方面的进展情况。本报告未对美国在改进有效性指标方面取得的进展进行评价,相关内容将被安排在下次后续再评估,届时将决定是否对直接目标(IO)进行重新评级。

2. FINDINGS OF THE MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT

二、互评估报告的发现

The MER rated the U.S. as follows for technical compliance:

Given these results, the FATF placed the U.S. in enhanced follow-up. The following experts assessed the U.S.’ request for technical compliance re-ratings:

鉴于40项技术合规性指标中有10个“部分合规”或“不合规”,并且核心指标中有2个“部分合规”或“不合规”,FATF将美国列入强化后续进程。本次,根据美国要求对技术合规性指标进行重新评级的申请,以下专家实施了再评估:

l Mr. Alvin Koh, Deputy Director & Specialist Leader, Monetary Authority of Singapore, Singapore, and

l 新加坡金管局(MAS)副主任兼专家组组长Alvin Koh先生;

l Mr. Bill Peoples, Legal Services, New Zealand Police, New Zealand.

l 新西兰警察局法务处Bill Peoples先生。

Section 3 of this report summarises the U.S.’ progress made in improving technical compliance. Section 4 sets out the conclusion and a table showing which Recommendation has been re-rated.

本报告第三节对美国在改进技术合规性方面取得的进展做了概述。第四节给出了结论及重新评级结果。

3. OVERVIEW OF PROGRESS TO IMPROVE TECHNICAL COMPLIANCE

三、在改进技术合规性方面的进展情况概述

This section summarises the U.S.’ progress to improve its technical compliance by:

本节对美国在改进技术合规性方面的进展情况做了概述,包括:

l a) Addressing certain technical compliance deficiencies identified in the MER, and

l ⑴解决互评估报告中指出的技术合规性缺陷的情况;

l b) Implementing new requirements where the FATF Recommendations have changed since the on-site visit to the US (Recommendations 2, 5, 7, 8, 15, 18 and 21).

l ⑵执行自现场评估结束以来发生过调整的FATF建议(建议2、5、7、8、15、18和21)新要求的情况。

3.1. Progress to address technical compliance deficiencies identified in the MER

1、在解决互评估报告中指出的技术合规性缺陷方面的进展情况

The U.S. has made progress to address the technical compliance deficiencies identified in the MER in relation to Recommendation 10. As a result of this progress, the U.S. has been re-rated on this Recommendation.

美国在解决互评估报告中指出的涉及建议10的技术合规性缺陷方面取得了进展。因改进充分,该项指标被重新评级。

Recommendation 10 (originally rated PC)

建议10 客户尽职调查(原被评为“部分合规”)

In its 4th round MER, the U.S was rated PC with R.10 based on the following deficiencies: lack of customer due diligence (CDD) requirements to ascertain and verify the identity of beneficial owners (BO), which was a significant shortcoming; investment advisers (IAs) were not directly covered by Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) obligations (some IAs were indirectly covered through affiliations with banks, bank holding companies and broker-dealers); financial institutions other than in the securities and derivatives sectors were not explicitly required to identify and verify the identity of persons authorised to act on behalf of customers, and some FIs were not explicitly required to understand and obtain information on the purpose and intended nature of the business relationship. FIs were not required to understand the ownership and control structure of customers that are legal persons/arrangements.

在第四轮互评估报告中,美国在建议10上被评为“部分合规”,缺陷包括:缺乏关于确定与核实受益所有人(BO)身份的客户尽职调查(CDD)要求(重大缺陷);未将投资顾问(IA)直接纳入《银行保密法》(BSA)规定的义务主体范围(尽管某些投资顾问因为与银行、银行控股公司和经纪自营商的关系被间接纳入义务主体范围);未明确要求除证券和衍生品行业外的金融机构识别与核实授权代表客户行事的个人或实体的身份,也未明确要求某些金融机构了解业务关系的目的和预期性质并获取相关信息。未要求金融机构了解法人和法律安排的所有权和控制结构。

As of May 2018, 31 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) § 1010.230 (Beneficial ownership requirements for legal entity customers) requires covered financial institutions to establish and maintain written procedures that are reasonably designed to identify and verify beneficial owners of legal entity customers and to include such procedures in their anti-money laundering (AML) compliance program. The requirements to identify and verify BO, as applied to legal persons (such as corporations and limited liability companies), is clear with respect to both its ownership threshold and its control element. It is however not explicit as regard all type of legal arrangements, but would cover legal arrangements (such as trust) which are required to be registered by certain state authorities - such legal arrangements are considered legal entities and hence covered.

截至2018年5月,《美国联邦法规》第31编第1010节第230条(法人客户的受益所有权要求)要求纳入义务主体范围的金融机构建立和维护设计合理的书面程序以识别与核实法人客户的受益所有人,并将此类程序纳入反洗钱合规计划。适用于法人(如股份有限公司和有限责任公司)的识别与核实受益所有人的要求在持股比例和控制要素两方面都很明确。然而,除对某些被视为法律实体而要求在国家主管部门注册的法律安排(如信托)进行明确外,上述规定未对所有类型法律安排进行明确。

In addition, the U.S. has introduced ongoing CDD requirements for FIs, which included the need to have appropriate risk-based procedures on understanding the nature and purpose of customer relationships for the purpose of developing a customer risk profile, and ongoing monitoring of the customer relationship to identify and report suspicious transactions and, on a risk basis, to maintain and update customer information.

此外,美国对金融机构提出了持续的客户尽职调查要求,包括应当建立适当的风险为本程序以了解客户关系的性质和目的从而确定客户风险状况,以及持续监控客户关系以识别和报告可疑交易,并在风险基础上维护和更新客户信息。

However, a few minor technical gaps remain, including the lack of explicit BO requirements, mainly in relation to other trust relevant parties for legal arrangements. Limited measures have been taken to improve the occasional transaction threshold of USD 3 000 for Money Services Business (MSBs) and to improve gaps with regard to life insurance companies. In addition, IAs are still not directly covered by BSA obligations.

然而,仍有一些小的技术差距,包括缺乏明确的受益所有人要求,这主要涉及法律安排的其他信托相关方。在提高货币服务企业(MSB)的客户尽职调查起点金额(一次性交易3000美元以上)及缩小寿险公司的差距方面采取的措施很有限。此外,仍未将投资顾问直接纳入《银行保密法》规定的义务主体范围。

Overall, the U.S. has addressed a number of the key identified deficiencies, but deficiencies (especially in relation to all types of legal arrangements) still remain. The U.S. is therefore re-rated as Largely Compliant with R.10.

总的来说,尽管仍有其他缺陷(特别是涉及所有类型法律安排的缺陷),但美国确实解决了一系列关键缺陷。因此,美国在建议10上被重新评级为“大致合规”。

3.2. Progress on Recommendations which have changed since the adoption of the MER

2、在执行自互评估报告获通过以来发生过调整的FATF建议新要求方面的进展情况

Since the U.S. 4th round MER on-site visit, the FATF has amended Recommendations 2, 5, 7, 8, 15, 18 and 21. This section considers the U.S.’ compliance with the new requirements, and its progress to address the technical compliance deficiencies identified in the MER in relation to these Recommendations.

自美国第四轮互评估报告现场评估结束以来,FATF对建议2、5、7、8、15、18和21进行了修订。本节对美国遵守新要求的情况及在解决互评估报告中指出的涉及上述建议的技术合规性缺陷方面的进展情况进行了考察。

Recommendation 2 (originally rated C)

建议2 国家层面合作与协调(原被评为“合规”)

In October 2018, R.2 was amended to require countries to have cooperation and coordination between relevant authorities to ensure compatibility of AML and counter-terrorist financing (AML/CFT) requirements with Data Protection and Privacy rules. The amended Recommendation further requires a domestic mechanism for exchange of information. In its 4th round MER, the U.S. was rated C with R.2.

2018年10月,FATF对建议2进行了修订,要求各国在相关主管部门之间进行合作与协调,以确保反洗钱和反恐怖融资要求与数据保护和隐私规则相兼容。修订后的建议进一步要求建立国内信息交流机制。在第四轮互评估报告中,美国在建议2上被评为“合规”。

The U.S. complies with the revised requirements of R.2. Domestic coordination and cooperation, including exchange of information domestically concerning the development and implementation of AML/CFT policies and activities, were considered in the U.S. 4th round MER to be an overall strength of the U.S. system. In addition, the publication of the first National Strategy for Combating Terrorist and Other Illicit Financing in 2018 further affirms the ability of various agencies in the U.S. to coordinate and exchange information.

美国符合修订后的建议2要求。美国第四轮互评估报告认为,包括国内关于制定和执行反洗钱和反恐怖融资政策和活动的信息交流在内的国内协调与合作是美国反洗钱和反恐怖融资体系整体实力的体现。此外,2018年发布的首份《打击恐怖主义和其他非法金融国家战略》进一步肯定了美国各类监管机构协调和信息交流的能力。

The U.S. does not have a central data protection authority, nor a privacy regime that conceives the protection of privacy as a fundamental right in all circumstances. While there are various statues that protect financial data, these do not inhibit the implementation of AML/CFT measures or requirements (see criterion 9.1 of the U.S. 4th round MER). In addition, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes (TFFC) coordinates with a number of authorities to ensure privacy and other restrictions do not unduly hinder the dissemination of information for AML/CFT purposes.

美国没有中央数据保护主管部门,也没有在任何情况下都将隐私保护视为基本权利的隐私制度。尽管有各种保护金融数据的法规,但这些法规并不妨碍反洗钱和反恐怖融资措施或要求的执行(参见美国第四轮互评估报告评审标准9.1)。此外,美国财政部恐怖融资和金融犯罪办公室(TFFC)与一系列主管部门进行了协调,以确保隐私和其他限制不会不适当地妨碍反洗钱和反恐怖融资信息的移送。

The revised and new criteria have both been met. The U.S. therefore remains rated Compliant with R.2.

美国符合修订后的及新增的评审标准。因此,美国在建议2上被维持在“合规”。

Recommendation 5 (originally rated C)

建议5 恐怖融资犯罪(原被评为“合规”)

In February 2016, a new obligation was added to R.5, requiring countries to criminalise the financing of foreign terrorist fighters.

2016年2月,FATF在建议5项下增加了一项新的义务,要求各国将资助外国恐怖主义战斗人员(FTF)的行为定为犯罪。

The U.S. federal criminal terrorist financing (TF) offences are broad enough to cover this aspect, since the time of the U.S. 4th round MER. Operation Rhino, for example, described in paragraph 193 of the MER, provided an example of an enforcement action involving individuals travelling abroad and included an enforcement response against individuals who facilitated travel. Facilitation includes financing the travel of individuals to another country.

自第四轮互评估报告获通过以来,美国联邦恐怖融资(TF)犯罪的范围广泛到足以涵盖该义务。例如,根据互评估报告第193段所述,犀牛行动提供了一个关于个人出国加入恐怖组织的强制措施的示例,其中包括应对个人为出国提供资金等便利的强制措施。

In addition, several cases were pursued against foreign terrorist fighters and attempted supporters subsequent to the MER, which confirm the existing TF offences are broad enough.The U.S. therefore remains rated Compliant with R.5.

此外,自互评估报告获通过以来,美国追查了若干起针对外国恐怖主义战斗人员和未遂支持者的案件,这些案件证实了现有恐怖融资犯罪的范围足够广泛。因此,美国在建议5上被维持在“合规”。

Recommendation 7 (originally rated LC)

建议7 扩散相关定向金融制裁(原被评为“大致合规”)

In November 2017, R.7 was amended to reflect changes to the United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) on proliferation financing since the FATF standards were issued in February 2012.

2017年11月,FATF对建议7进行了修订,以反映自2012年2月FATF标准发布以来联合国安理会(UNSC)关于扩散融资决议的调整情况。

In its 4th round MER, the U.S. was rated LC with R.7. The deficiency was in relation to the fact that the U.S. had applied targeted financial sanctions (TFS) without delay to most, but not all persons designated by the UN pursuant to UNSCRs 1718 and 1737, which was a minor deficiency as the US implemented 90% (138 of the 154) of the UN Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)-related and Iran-related listings without delay (within a matter of hours).

在第四轮互评估报告中,美国在建议7上被评为“大致合规”。小缺陷在于,美国毫不迟延地对根据联合国安理会第1718号和第1737号决议列名的大多数而不是所有个人或实体实施了定向金融制裁,例如美国毫不迟延地(在几个小时内)执行了联合国朝鲜和伊朗相关名单中的90%(154个中的138个)。

The U.S. implements UN TFS through a combination of legal authorities that are codified in the regulations of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Asset Control. These are: the Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators Sanctions Regulations (31 C.F.R. Part 544, which implements Executive Order 13382), the North Korea Sanctions Regulations (31 C.F.R. 510), the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations (31 C.F.R. part 560), the Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations (31 C.F.R. part 561), and the Iranian Human Rights Abuses Sanctions Regulations (31 C.F.R. part 562).

美国通过财政部海外资产控制办公室(OFAC)条例中编纂的法律权力组合来执行联合国定向金融制裁,包括:《大规模杀伤性武器(WMD)扩散者制裁条例》(《美国联邦法规》第31编第544部分、该条例对第13382号行政令进行补充)、《朝鲜制裁条例》(《美国联邦法规》第31编第510节)、《伊朗交易和制裁条例》(《美国联邦法规》第31编第560部分)、《伊朗金融制裁条例》(《美国联邦法规》第31编第561部分)及《伊朗人权侵犯制裁条例》(《美国联邦法规》第31编第562部分)。

On DPRK, UNSCRs 1718 and 1874 have been implemented and the U.S. issued press releases relevant to the listings in UNSCRs 2087, 2094, 2270, and 2321. The press releases accompany most U.S. designations. Whenever a UN listing is not reflected in the press release, it is because that individual or entity was already listed by the authorities. On Iran, for the purposes of R.7, UNSCR 2231 terminated several previous UNSCRs relating to Iran and weapons of mass destruction proliferation, but no individual or entity that has been added to the UNSCR 2231 list since it was created (hence no specific release needed).

关于朝鲜,美国执行了联合国安理会第1718号和1874号决议,并发布了第2087号、2094号、2270号和2321号决议所列名单相关新闻稿。大多数美国列名的个人或实体附有新闻稿。如新闻稿中未提及联合国名单,那意味着该个人或实体已被主管部门列入本国名单。关于伊朗,出于定向金融制裁需要,联合国安理会第2231号决议终止了先前几个关于伊朗和大规模杀伤性武器扩散的决议,但自该决议发布以来,无任何个人或实体被列入决议名单(因此无需发布具体新闻稿)。

However, the deficiency in its 4th round MER has not been fully addressed. The U.S. has implemented around 93% (versus 90% at time of MER) of the total UN Proliferation Financing (PF)-related listings, but has still not covered all of the persons/entities designated by the PF-related UNSCRs.

然而,第四轮互评估报告中指出的缺陷尚未得到完全解决。尽管美国执行了联合国扩散融资(PF)相关名单总量的约93%(互评估报告发布时为90%),但仍未涵盖扩散融资相关决议列名的所有个人或实体。

On this basis, the U.S. remains rated Largely Compliant with R.7.

因此,美国在建议7上被维持在“大致合规”。

Recommendation 8 (originally rated LC)

建议8 非营利组织(原被评为“大致合规”)

In June 2016, R.8 and its Interpretive Note were substantially revised, and the assessment of R.8 in the MER therefore needed to be reviewed.

2016年6月,FATF对建议8及其释义进行了实质性修订,因此需要对互评估报告中建议8的评估进行审查。

In its 4th round MER, the U.S. was rated LC with R.8, based on a minor deficiency in relation to the fact that houses of worships were exempt from the requirement of applying to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) for recognition of their tax-exemption status.

在第四轮互评估报告中,美国在建议8上被评为“大致合规”。小缺陷在于,宗教场所无需向国税局(IRS)申请即可享受免税。

The 2018 National Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment deals extensively with charitable organisations and the risk of TF abuse in line with the required by the revisions to R.8. The U.S. has regulatory and administrative mechanisms, described in its 4th round MER, that promote accountability and integrity in the management of non-profit organisations (NPOs). In addition, the IRS monitors compliance of NPOs with the U.S. tax laws and can conduct criminal investigations as necessary. Sanctions applied are proportionate and dissuasive in case of violation of requirements.

根据修订后的建议8要求,《2018年国家恐怖融资风险评估报告》广泛涉及慈善组织和被滥用于恐怖融资的风险。根据第四轮互评估报告所述,美国的监管和行政机制能够促进非营利组织(NPO)管理的问责制和诚信。此外,国税局对非营利组织遵守美国税法的情况进行监控,并在必要时进行刑事调查。对违规行为采取的处罚措施是相称和有劝诫性的。

Moreover, there are mechanisms to ensure effective cooperation, coordination and information sharing on TF issues, including as regards NPOs. There are multiple mechanisms to promptly share information regarding suspected terrorist abuse.

此外,还有一些机制能够确保在包括非营利组织在内的恐怖融资问题上进行有效的合作、协调与信息共享。有多种机制可迅速共享关于疑似被恐怖分子滥用的信息。

However, the minor deficiency identified in the 4th round MER remains, as houses of worships are still exempt from the requirements of applying to the IRS for recognition of their tax-exemption status.

然而,第四轮互评估报告中发现的小缺陷仍存在,宗教场所仍无需向国税局申请即可享受免税。

On this basis, the U.S. remains rated Largely Compliant with R.8.

因此,美国在建议8上被维持在“大致合规”。

Recommendation 15 (originally rated LC)

建议15 新技术(原被评为“大致合规”)

In October 2019, revisions were made to methodology for assessing R.15, to reflect amendments to the FATF Standards incorporating virtual assets (VA) and virtual asset service providers (VASP).

2019年10月,FATF对建议15的评估方法进行了修订,以反映FATF标准对虚拟资产(VA)和虚拟资产服务提供商(VASP)的修订。

In its 4th round MER, the U.S. was rated LC with R.15, based on minor deficiencies, including that not all IAs were covered and there were no explicit requirements for FIs to address the risks presented by new technologies.

在第四轮互评估报告中,美国在建议15上被评为“大致合规”。小缺陷在于,未将所有投资顾问纳入义务主体范围,也未明确要求金融机构应对新技术带来的风险。

The U.S. has met or mostly met most of the new criteria of R.15, through the following actions, although minor deficiencies, such as coverage of IAs, remain:

尽管仍有小缺陷(如未将所有投资顾问纳入义务主体范围),但美国通过以下行动达到或基本达到了建议15的大多数新增的评审标准:

l U.S. authorities understand and are aware of the ML/TF risks emerging from virtual assets. Aside from various taskforce and working groups set up to consider the risks, their risk understanding is also reflected in their 2018 National Money Laundering Risk Assessment and National Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment, as well as the 2018 National Strategy for Combating Terrorist and Other Illicit Financing.

l 美国主管部门理解并意识到虚拟资产带来的洗钱和恐怖融资风险。除成立各种特别行动组和工作组来审查风险外,他们对风险的理解也反映在《2018年国家洗钱风险评估报告》、《2018年国家恐怖融资风险评估报告》及《2018年打击恐怖主义和其他非法金融国家战略》中。

l The combination of the various U.S. legislation would cover the five classes of VASPs as defined by the FATF, but it does not explicitly include all VASPs that is solely incorporated the U.S. (i.e. a VASP which does not perform any activity relating to U.S. persons, or a U.S.’ nexus).

l 美国的各种法规组合可涵盖FATF定义的五类虚拟资产服务提供商,但未明确包括所有仅在美国注册的虚拟资产服务提供商(即该虚拟资产服务提供商不从事任何涉及美国人士或美国关系的活动)。

l Most convertible virtual currencies (CVC) exchangers, administrators and other similar entities are regulated as money transmitters (or MSBs) under the BSA and have to implement AML/CFT programs as MSBs. Such MSBs have to develop, implement and maintain an effective AML program and the program shall be commensurate with the risks posed by the location, size, nature and volume of the financial services provided by the MSBs. Further, banks and persons registered with, and functionally regulated or examined by, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), that engage in transactions denominated in value that substitutes for currency will be subject to BSA regulations according to the applicable section of 31 CFR Chapter X. However, the CDD threshold for occasional transactions for MSBs is USD 3 000 (as opposed to USD 1 000 required in the FATF Standards) and this higher threshold is not clearly supported by low ML/TF risks.

l 按照《银行保密法》,大多数可兑换虚拟货币(CVC)交易商、发行方和其他类似实体被当作汇款公司(或货币服务企业)进行监管,必须像货币服务企业那样执行反洗钱和反恐怖融资计划。此类货币服务企业必须制定、执行和维护有效反洗钱计划,该计划应当与货币服务企业提供金融服务的地点、规模、性质和数量所构成的风险相称。此外,对根据《美国联邦法规》第31编第10章的适用条款在证监会(SEC)和商品期货交易委员会(CFTC)注册并受其监管或检查的银行和其他个人或实体,如其从事的交易以替代货币的价值计量,则应当遵守《银行保密法》的规定。然而,货币服务企业办理一次性交易的客户尽职调查起点金额为3000美元(而不是FATF标准要求的1000美元),却并没有明显证据表明该领域的洗钱和恐怖融资风险较低。

l MSBs must register with FinCEN and renew every two years. MSBs have to be licensed at the state level, and background checks are conducted at the state level prior to the issuing of licenses. CVC providers examined by SEC or CFTC are also subject to fit and proper checks.

l 货币服务企业必须在金融犯罪执法网络(FinCEN)注册并每两年更新一次。货币服务企业必须在州一级获得许可,并在颁发许可证之前进行背景调查。受证监会或商品期货交易委员会检查的可兑换虚拟货币提供商同样要接受适当的调查。

l In general, FinCEN, SEC, and CFTC are able to apply a range of proportionate and dissuasive sanctions for non-compliance, including for CVCs that are unlicensed or not-registered. The U.S. authorities have, even prior to the revisions made to R.15, also taken actions against CVCs providers for operating as an unlicensed money transmitting business (e.g. U.S. vs E-Gold and Liberty Reserve).

l 总的来说,FinCEN、证监会和商品期货交易委员会能够对包括无证经营可兑换虚拟货币在内的违规行为采取一系列相称和有劝诫性的处罚措施。即使是在FATF对建议15进行修订之前,美国主管部门也对无证经营的可兑换虚拟货币提供商采取了行动(如美国诉“电子黄金”和“自由储备”案)。

l Since 2014, IRS and FinCEN have conducted examinations of various CVC providers, including administrators, some of the largest exchangers by volume (a key vulnerability assessed by the U.S. authorities in this space), individual peer-to-peer exchangers, etc. The U.S.’ strategy is to inspect all covered financial institutions but does not specifically identify higher risk VASPs, as they are largely covered under the broader MSB regime. Therefore, it is not entirely clear whether the current approach is sufficiently risk focused, especially since only 30% of all registered CVC providers have been inspected since 2014.

l 自2014年以来,国税局和FinCEN对包括发行方、交易量最大的一些交易商(美国主管部门在该领域评估的一个关键漏洞)、个人点对点交易商等在内的各类可兑换虚拟货币提供商进行了检查。美国的战略是检查所有纳入义务主体范围的金融机构,但未对风险较高的虚拟资产服务提供商作出具体规定,而它们大部分被涵盖在更广泛的货币服务企业制度项下。因此,尚不完全清楚目前的方法是否足够风险为本,特别是自2014年以来,所有注册的可兑换虚拟货币服务提供商中只有30%接受过检查。

l FinCEN, SEC and CFTC have published a range of guidance over the years. In particular, FinCEN’s Guidance issued in May 2019 provides a good overview of the existing regime and regulatory expectations with regard to CVC providers in the U.S.

l 过去几年,FinCEN、证监会和商品期货交易委员会发布了一系列指引。特别是FinCEN于2019年5月发布的指引很好地概述了美国可兑换虚拟货币提供商的现行制度和监管期望。

l With regard to mutual legal assistance and international cooperation, the U.S. was rated LC for R.37, R.38, and R.39, and C for R.40 in its 4th round MER, due mainly to concerns relating to application of dual criminality requirements. Financial supervisors (such as SEC, CFTC and FinCEN) have a legal basis for providing cooperation with their foreign counterparts (regardless of their respective nature or status), in particular with respect to the exchange of supervisory information related to or relevant for AML/CFT purposes. However, given the overall treatment of U.S. authorities of CVC as a form of assets, which can be subject to seizure and confiscation, the gaps are the same with those identified in the 4th round MER.

l 就司法协助(MLA)和国际合作而言,在第四轮互评估报告中,美国在建议37、38和39上被评为“大致合规”,在建议40上被评为“合规”,主要问题在于对双重犯罪要求的适用。金融监管机构(如证监会、商品期货交易委员会和FinCEN)具备与外国同行合作的法律依据(无论其性质或地位如何),特别是在反洗钱和反恐怖融资相关监管信息交流方面。然而,考虑到美国主管部门将可兑换虚拟货币视为一种可扣押和没收的资产形式,第四轮互评估报告中指出的差距并未缩小。

On this basis, the U.S. remains rated as Largely Compliant with R.15.

因此,美国在建议15上被维持在“大致合规”。

Recommendation 18 (originally rated LC)

建议18 内部控制、境外分支机构和附属机构(原被评为“大致合规”)

In February 2018, R.18 was amended to reflect the November 2017 amendments to the FATF Standards (interpretive note 18), which clarified the requirements on sharing of information and analyses related to unusual or suspicious transactions within financial groups, and the interaction of these requirements with tipping-off provisions.

2018年2月,FATF对建议18进行了修订,以反映2017年11月对FATF标准(释义18)的修订,后者澄清了金融集团内部异常或可疑交易相关信息共享和分析的要求,以及这些要求与泄密条款的相互作用。

In its 4th round MER, the U.S. was rated LC with R.18, based on minor deficiencies that not all IAs were covered and there was no explicit obligation to inform the home supervisors if the host country did not permit proper implementation of AML/CFT measures.

在第四轮互评估报告中,美国在建议18上被评为“大致合规”,小缺陷在于,未将所有投资顾问纳入义务主体范围,并且在东道国禁止有效执行反洗钱和反恐怖融资措施时也无明确义务通知本国监管机构。

The revised standard is met. There are no specific prohibitions preventing covered financial institutions from sharing customer information within the financial group. In 2006, FinCEN issued guidance permitting banks, securities and futures firms to share SARs as well as information underlying SARs (subject to certain exceptions and qualifications) with parent entities, both within and outside of the U.S. In 2014, FinCEN also highlighted in an Advisory that information should be shared throughout the organization (which would include multiple affiliated institutions) and that there is information in various departments within a financial institution that may be useful and should be shared with the compliance staff. The 31 U.S.C. § 5318 also contains a general prohibition on tipping off.

美国符合修订后的标准。没有具体禁令禁止纳入义务主体范围的金融机构在金融集团内部共享客户信息。2006年,FinCEN发布指引,允许银行、证券和期货公司与美国境内外的母公司共享可疑活动报告(SAR)及相关信息(受某些例外和条件限制)。2014年,FinCEN还在一份建议中强调,信息应当在整个组织(包括多个附属机构)内共享,金融机构内部各个部门可能有用的信息应当与合规人员共享。《美国法典》第31编第5318节也包含一项关于泄密的一般禁令。

However, the deficiencies identified in its 4th round MER relating to coverage of IAs and obligation to inform the home supervisors, if the host country does not permit proper implementation of AML/CFT measures, still remain.

然而,在第四轮互评估报告中指出的关于未将所有投资顾问纳入义务主体范围及在东道国禁止有效执行反洗钱和反恐怖融资措施时无明确义务通知本国监管机构的缺陷仍存在。

On this basis, the U.S. remains rated as Largely Compliant with R.18.

因此,美国在建议18上被维持在“大致合规”。

Recommendation 21 (originally rated C)

建议21 泄密和保密(原被评为“合规”)

In February 2018, R.21 was amended to clarify that anti-tipping-off provisions are not intended to inhibit information sharing under R.18. In its 4th round MER, the U.S. was rated C on R.21.

2018年2月,FATF对建议21进行了修订,以澄清反泄密条款并非旨在禁止建议18项下的信息共享。在第四轮互评估报告中,美国在建议21上被评为“合规”。

The revised standard remains met. Pursuant to 31 C.F.R. 1020.320(e), the provisions of prohibiting financial institutions and their directors, officers and employees from disclosing the fact that an SAR or related information is being filed shall not be construed as prohibiting the sharing of an SAR or any information related to the SAR.

美国仍符合修订后的标准。根据《美国联邦法规》第31编第1020节第320条第(e)款,不得将禁止金融机构及其董事、高级管理人员和员工披露可疑活动报告或相关信息报送情况的规定解释为禁止共享可疑活动报告或任何相关信息。

The U.S. therefore remains rated as Compliant with R.21.

因此,美国在建议21上被维持在“合规”。

3.3. Brief overview on other Recommendations rated PC/NC

3、其他被评为“部分合规”或“不合规”指标的简要概述

The U.S. has reported progress on other Recommendations rated PC/NC, such as R.1, R.12, R.16, R.20, R.24, R.25 and R.28. Actions underway include, among others, undertaking a systemic review of its AML/CFT system to more effectively address identified risks, including with respect to some sectors currently uncovered.

美国报告了其他被评为“部分合规”或“不合规”指标(如建议1、12、16、20、24、25和28)的进展情况。正在采取的行动包括对反洗钱和反恐怖融资体系进行系统性审查以更有效应对风险,包括目前尚未发现的某些行业的风险。

CONCLUSION

结论

The U.S. has made progress to address the technical compliance deficiencies identified in the MER and has been upgraded on Recommendation 10. After the technical compliance re-rating, five Recommendations remain PC and four Recommendations remain NC.

美国在解决互评估报告中指出的技术合规性缺陷方面取得了进展,并在建议10上被上调了评级。重新评级后,5项指标被维持在“部分合规”,4项指标被维持在“不合规”。

Technical compliance with the FATF Recommendations has been re-rated as follows:

技术合规性指标被重新评级为:

Table 2. Technical compliance with re-ratings, February 2020

The U.S. will remain in enhanced follow-up on the basis that it has nine Recommendations remaining rated PC/NC for technical compliance, and three Immediate Outcomes remaining rated ME/LE for effectiveness. In accordance with the FATF Procedures, the U.S. will report back to the FATF on progress to strengthen its implementation of AML/CFT measures.

鉴于9项技术合规性指标被维持在“部分合规”或“不合规”,以及3项有效性指标被维持在“中等有效”或“低效”,美国仍将被列在强化后续进程。根据FATF的程序,美国将继续向FATF报告在强化反洗钱和反恐怖融资措施执行方面的进展情况。


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